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Rare prior to the deregulation of the airline industry, air carrier bankruptcies became rather 
endemic	in	the	period	1982-2005.	Since	1982,	over	175	airlines	have	filed	under	the	bankruptcy	
codes.  This number includes eight of the carriers that were formerly referred to as “trunk carriers,” 
now	known	as	“Majors.”	Major	carriers	are	defined	as	those	with	annual	revenues	exceeding	$1.0	
billion. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the recent performance of these carriers using a 
statistical	model	specifically	designed	to	predict	the	likelihood	of	financial	stress	for	airlines.	The	
paper will also update past research in this important industry to demonstrate the very precarious 
nature	of	profitability.	The	major	reasons	for	the	improvement	of	the	industry’s	profitability	will	be	
briefly	discussed.	The	analysis	will	 show	 that	 the	current	financial	condition	of	 the	 industry	has	
improved	significantly	due	to	increased	concentration	and	the	market	domination	of	some	carriers,	




The past several decades have been an extremely turbulent era for the U.S. airline industry. The 
events of 9/11, the steep increase in the price of fuel, and the great recession starting in 2008 all 
interacted to heighten the financial stress facing all airlines. With the recent additions in the mid-
2000s of ATA, Aloha, Champion, Skyline, Pacific Western Air, Legend Air and others, the number 
of bankruptcy filings had risen to over 175 by 2016. All have filed since the deregulation of the 
airline industry in 1978. The vast majority of the total has been the smaller airlines categorized 
by the Department of Transportation (DOT) as large and medium regional air carriers. The major 
carriers, however, have suffered significantly. DOT classifies carriers by groups based on total dollar 
operating revenues. Major carriers have revenues of $1.0 billion or larger. The first filing was by 
the now defunct Braniff in 1982.  The filings of major carriers (Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, 
Northwest, PanAm, TWA, UAL, and USAir) have garnered the most attention for obvious reasons. 
Iconic carriers such as Braniff, Eastern, and PanAm have disappeared forever and the others have 
merged in order to survive. The purpose of this paper is to assess the current financial condition 
facing the major U.S. carriers as the U.S. economy continues to gain traction in 2016, outline briefly 
a few of the causes for what is found, and also to provide an overview of the risky nature of this 
industry. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Applied financial ratio analysis has been around ever since there were income statements and 
balance sheets to assess. The quest, however, has been to combine these ratios into a score that 
could be useful in assessing the financial health of a firm over time. Beaver was the first (1966) 
to suggest that ratios analysis could have some predictive ability and utilized a univariate model 
using cash flow as the predictor. Altman (1968) then sought to advance the technique by developing 
the first generic bankruptcy scoring model using multiple ratios. Known as the Z Score, the model 
combined various balance sheet and income statement ratios using a regression technique known as 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis or MDA. The model was derived from data from a cross section of 
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different industries and has proven to be widely used (Altman 2006). Gritta (1982) used the model 
to predict the failure of Braniff and Continental before the events occurred. Altman et al. (1977) also 
sought to improve on Z Score with his ZETA® Model. Other techniques have been explored over the 
past several decades. Some researchers have used approaches such as Neural Networks (Zhang et 
al. 1999; Coats and Fant 1993), Genetic Algorithms (Carvalho and Freitus 2004; Varetto 1998), and 
Fuzzy Logic (Silva et al. 2005) in attempts to improve forecasting accuracy.
Models designed for specific industries, however, can be more powerful or accurate than generic 
models. Altman and Gritta (1984), for example, used the generic Altman ZETA® Model in assessing 
the U.S. air carriers,1 but it was felt that models built on industry specific data might yield superior 
results. In fact, several researchers have used airline data to develop industry-specific models. 
One such model was called AIRSCORE (Chow et al. 1991). In addition, Gudmundsson (2002) 
employed a model which incorporated airline management variables that the author thought could 
further improve forecasting accuracy, and Silva et al. (2005) employed Fuzzy Logic to forecast air 
carrier stress. Finally, Pilarski and Dinh (1999) designed a model, called P-Score, specifically for air 
transportation. P-Score has the advantage that its inputs are readily available from data sources such 
as gurufocus.com and other sites. The P-Score model is a logit model that generates the probability 
of failure.2 P-Score is calculated as follows:
(1) W = -1.98X1 –4.95X2 –1.96X3 –0.14X4 –2.38X5
Where:
X1 = operating revenues/total assets (REV/TA= a turnover ratio)
X2 = retained earnings/total assets (RE/TA=a past profitability ratio)
X3 = equity/total debt obligations (EQUITY/DEBT=a leverage measure)
X4 = liquid assets/current maturities of total debt obligations (CA/CL= a liquidity ratio)
X5 = earnings before interest and taxes/operating revenues (EBIT/REV=profitability) 
(2) The number P is determined by:  P = 1/[1+e-w]
Financial analysts normally compute ratios which measure four aspects of financial health. 
Those measures are liquidity, leverage (use of debt finance), profitability, and turnover (efficiency). 
Several of the input ratios (X1, X2 , and X3) are ratios from the famous Altman Z Score model. Rather 
than producing a score that must be compared to a scale, as is the case with the previous models, 
this model produces the probability of bankruptcy.  P is that probability.  The higher the P value, the 
greater is the carrier’s financial stress and the more likely it is to fail and vice-versa.
The majors assessed in this study are Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, JetBlue, SkyWest, 
Spirit, Southwest, United, and USAir. There have been a number of mergers that have affected the 
industry and thus this analysis. Northwest was merged into Delta, Continental into United, and TWA 
into American and recently USAir and American combined. All of these merged carriers have filed 
under the bankruptcy codes, in some cases more than once.  Only passenger carriers are included in 
this study.  All cargo carriers, such as FedEx, UPS, and DHL, are not.
Table 1 shows the application of P-Score to Southwest Airlines. The individual ratios are 
calculated from the carrier’s income statements and balance sheets for the years 2003-2013. The 
source of the raw data was gurufocus.com. Southwest has always been regarded as the most 
profitable and stable airline in the industry, the result of superior operating strategies3 and its far more 
conservative financial strategies over time.4 This analysis clearly shows that excellent performance 
resulting from those operating and financial strategies.  As the P-Scores indicate, its risk of failure 
has been the lowest relative to the rest of the carriers and is at or near 0%.
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Table 1:  Southwest Air P-Scores
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
REV 5,937 6,530 7,584 9,086 9,861 11,023 10,350 12,104 15,658 17,088 17,699
EBIT 483 554 820 934 791 449 262 988 693 623 1,278
TA 9,878 11,337 14,218 13,460 16,772 14,308 14,269 15,463 18,068 18,596 19,345
RE 3,883 4,089 4,557 4,307 4,788 4,919 4,983 5,399 5,395 5,768 6,431
EQ 5,052 5,524 6,675 6,449 6,941 4,953 5,466 6,237 6,877 6,992 7,336
DEBT 4,826 5,813 7,543 7,011 9,831 9,355 8,803 9,226 11,191 11,604 12,009
CA 2,313 2,172 3,620 2,601 4,443 2,893 3,358 4,279 4,345 4,227 4,456
CL 1,723 2,142 3,848 2,887 4,838 2,806 2,676 3,305 4,533 4,650 5,676
X1 0.601 0.576 0.533 0.675 0.588 0.770 0.725 0.783 0.867 0.919 0.915
X2 0.393 0.361 0.321 0.320 0.285 0.344 0.349 0.349 0.299 0.310 0.332
X3 1.047 0.950 0.885 0.920 0.706 0.529 0.621 0.676 0.615 0.603 0.611
X4 1.342 1.014 0.941 0.901 0.918 1.031 1.255 1.295 0.959 0.909 0.785
X5 0.081 0.085 0.108 0.103 0.080 0.041 0.025 0.082 0.044 0.036 0.072
W -5.569 -5.132 -4.766 -5.094 -4.281 -4.506 -4.618 -4.979 -4.638 -4.750 -4.936
P 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007
Source: Ratios and P values were calculated from raw data from gurufocus.com
Table 2 applies the model to the other major carriers for the years 2003-2013.
Table 2: P-Scores 2003-2013
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
American 0.270 0.264 0.279 0.212 0.156 0.305 0.444 0.391 0.527 0.568 0.480
Delta 0.255 0.618 0.777 0.929 0.087 0.661 0.438 0.333 0.310 0.279 0.070
United 0.674 0.711 0.999 0.135 0.107 0.479 0.504 0.316 0.161 0.205 0.150
USAir 0.175 0.255 0.266 0.037 0.028 0.202 0.241 0.115 0.102 0.064 merged
Southwest 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007
Alaska 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.074 0.059 0.114 0.080 0.044 0.033 0.022 0.009
JetBlue 0.063 0.093 0.136 0.133 0.135 0.130 0.112 0.088 0.079 0.064 0.050
SkyWest 0.006 0.005 0.039 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.020 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.012
Spirit na na na na na 0.449 0.203 0.103 0.001 0.001 0.000
Source: Calculated from raw data on gurufocus.com
Several important facts are evident from Table 2. Absent Southwest, Alaska, and SkyWest (the 
latter just recently defined as a major), the largest carriers have had a very turbulent history over 
the past decade and a half.  The result has been the mergers mentioned above. The failed carriers, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, TWA, United, and USAir, consummated mergers in order to survive.5 
While the events of 9/11 and the real estate crash causing the Great Recession have been responsible 
for dramatic increases in the likelihood of failure, American, Delta, and United, the three largest 
carriers, were still facing some problems according to the P-Scores. What really stands out is the 
ability of carriers, like Southwest and SkyWest to prosper in spite of 9/11 and the Great Recession. 
It does appear that the model shows an improvement in the carriers’ financial health over the time 
horizon spanning 2003-2013.  Further improvement has continued into late 2015. Table 3 lists the 
P-Scores for the carriers for the past almost two years.  The 2015 results are for the third quarter of 
this year.
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Source:  Calculated from data in carrier reports
The financial conditions of American, Delta, and United have dramatically improved, especially 
over the last several years, and the trends appears to be very positive. The big question is the “why” 
and the “whether if” this trend can persist and thus break the boom-bust cycle that has been so 
predominant in the history of this industry.
There seem to four major reasons for the significant improvement in the carriers’ financial 
condition. Two are more obvious. The first is that the economy has continued to grow, albeit 
somewhat slowly, out of the Great Recession. The second is the very low interest rates (due to 
Federal Reserve policies to assist the economic recovery) that have lowered the cost of capital to 
the carriers. The other two are not as obvious. The following figure shows the third key factor. Fuels 
costs have declined sharply due to the fall in oil prices to less than $35 a barrel in December 2014.
Figure 1: Aviation Fuel Prices, December 1990−December 2015
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The fourth factor is the greatly increased concentration in the industry. The significance of the 
mergers of Delta/Northwest, United/Continental, and American/USAir cannot be understated.6 The 
industry has been moving increasingly toward an oligopoly situation. This has allowed carriers to 
control air fares in many markets, impose extra charges on virtually everything from baggage to 
food to aisle seats, and the level of services passengers must endure.
There are several widely accepted measures used to demonstrate the existence of an oligopoly. 
Two important standards are the four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios. The concentration 
ratios show the percentage of domestic revenue passenger miles for each carrier. Table 4 shows the 
changes over time of the two measures. The four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios have been 
used in many court antitrust cases to judge the presence of an oligopoly.7
Table 4: Concentration Ratios Domestic Revenue Passenger Miles










Source: Air Carrier Traffic Statistics – various issues
Clearly there is an oligopoly developing in the domestic market, and passengers have felt the 
effects noted just above.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to assess the current financial condition of the airline industry. The 
scores have proven to be good at indicating the impending changes in the financial condition of 
carriers over time. The P-Score model clearly does a good job of measuring financial strength, and 
the study shows the significant ups and downs of air carriers over the past decade.
What is the answer to the question posed in the title of this paper? Based on the P-Score analysis, 
it appears that all of the major carriers have substantially improved their financial condition over the 
past several years. All have benefited from several factors which have dramatically increased profits. 
These include the huge decline in the price of a barrel of oil, the record low interest rates, the mergers 
that have increased the concentration of the four largest carriers, and the gradual improvement in 
the U.S. economy.
The failure rate of air carriers over the past 30 years has simply been abysmal8, and the P-Scores 
clearly demonstrate the fact that the risk could once again increase should if oil prices spike 
upwards, interest rates return to normal levels, or the economy falters. Things could also change 
should the USDOT and the Dept. of Justice choose to enforce anti-trust laws. In any case, the model 
is a tool useful to a wide audience involved with the air transport industry, including stockholders, 
bondholders, banks, lessors and other creditors, and governmental agencies that need to be able to 
gauge financial stress and the likelihood of future problems.  Finally, the model can be of aid to one 
other group not mentioned above. That group is airline management. The models show the variables 
that are critical to successful financial performance. Management can thus center on actions that will 
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improve the variables key to reversing the low and negative trends in the ratios, at least in part due 
to managerial mistakes in the areas of financial leverage, liquidity, and profitability.
Endnotes
1.  Other researchers have built industry specific models; Brocket et al. (1994) in the insurance 
industry and Altman (1973) specified models for industries such as the U.S. railroad industry 
and for over-the counter securities dealers.
 
2.   The AIRSCORE and P-SCORE models were generated using only air carrier data, but since the 
former requires data not readily available to the average person, this paper centers on the latter. 
AIRSCORE was developed by one of the current authors (Chow, Gritta, and Leung 1991). The 
International Center for Air Transportation at MIT [ICAT] has used the AIRSCORE model to 
track airlines, and both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the FAA have utilized two 
of the authors’ models in the past. Neural Nets and Genetic Algorithms have also been designed 
to assess the airline industry. For a summary of these approaches, see: (Gritta, Davalos, and 
Adrangi 2006).
3.  Lower costs per ASM (available seat mile) resulted from its hedging of fuel costs, its use of one 
type of aircraft (the B737), which minimizes pilot training expenses, and the carrier’s better 
than average relationship with its union employees (at least in the past). In addition, while 
Southwest does use a hub and spoke system, it operates its system less rigidly that some other 
carriers.
4.  Several studies have outlined the nature of risk in this industry and detailed Southwest’s 
minimal use of long-term debt finance and its effect on carrier stability. See, for example: 
(Gritta, Adrangi, and Adams 2006) and Gritta, Freed, and Chou (1998).
5.  A history of both the P-Scores and the Z Scores dating back to 1990 can be found in Goodfriend 
et al. (2004).
6.  The combination of American and USAir resulted when the latter bought the former out of 
bankruptcy in spite of the fact that the combined carrier bears the American name.
7.  Others are the Gini Coefficient, Herfindal Index, and Lorenz Curve. For a prior example applied 
to the air carriers, see Adrangi and Gritta (1986).
8.  It is hard to find a major industry in the U.S. economy, especially one so important in the U.S. 
economy, that has suffered as high a failure rate as have the air carriers. The following major 
carriers have filed one or more times: American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, 
TWA, United, and USAir. In addition, other carriers classed as majors, formerly known as 
“trunklines” in the period 1970-1980, have filed.  This list includes Braniff, Eastern, TWA, and 
PanAm (although the latter was classed as an “International.” These have all disappeared and 
TWA was merged into American. 
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